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Decentralization of natural resources management provides an opportunity for communities 
to increase their participation in related decision-making. Research should propose adapted 
methodologies enabling the numerous local stakeholders of these complex socio-ecological 
settings to define themselves their problems and to identify agreed-upon solutions. In the 
research presented in this paper, a Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach combining 
Role-Playing Games (RPG) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has been conducted in a 
highland community of Northern Thailand to support collective learning for adaptive land 
management. A representation of the situation was collectively built and used with local 
stakeholders as a platform to explore future scenarios. The results of this experiment 
highlight the need for adaptive and continuously evolving models because learning is 
evolving by its nature. The initial objective of this ComMod experiment was to address the 
problem of soil erosion. The participants identified the expansion of perennial crops as a 
promising solution and these discussions raised in turn a new problem related to unequal 
ability of villagers to invest in such crops. The researchers flexibly adapted their tools to the 
new emerging question. After an evaluation of the learning effects of this experiment, this 
article identifies two main factors that contributed to the success of this learning process : an 
increased participation of the local stakeholders, and the flexibility of the modelling process. 
The main suggestion of improvement is a stronger linkage with organizations at a higher 
institutional level to ensure concrete and sustainable impacts for the communities.  
 
KEYWORDS: Companion modelling, Collective Learning, Multi-Agent System, Role 
Playing Game, Natural Resource Management, Decentralization, Northern Thailand. 
 
1In Thailand, as in other countries in Southeast-Asia, after many decades of highly 
centralized governance, the general policymaking framework for Natural Resources 
Management (NRM) favours decentralization and public participation. The 1997 
Constitution was an important turning point. Article 79 provides measures to "promote and 
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encourage public participation in the preservation, maintenance and balanced exploitation of 
natural resources and biophysical diversity, and in the promotion, maintenance and 
protection of the quality of the environment" (Rutherford, 2002). Previous environmental 
policies had drastically restricted the access to natural resources for the ethnic minorities 
populating the highlands of Northern Thailand, because their agricultural practices were 
considered harmful to the environment (Ganjanapan, 2002). Therefore the principle of 
participation embraced by the so-called “people Constitution” and the establishment of 
elected Tambon councils at the sub-district level provide opportunities for communities to 
regain control over NRM and to increase their say in public affairs.  
But there is a need to develop innovative and context-adapted methodologies and tools to 
enable the diverse local stakeholders to genuinely participate in decision-making related to 
local NRM. The current debate in Thailand about the policy of decentralized rural credit 
implemented since 2002 is particularly illustrative of this need : whereas some academics 
denounce its negative impact on communities, because of a lack of preparation of villagers to 
manage such funds, the government is moving ahead to implement this credit policy without 
more caution.   
As in many parts of mountain mainland Southeast Asia, the highlands of Northern 
Thailand are characterized by increasingly complex and dynamic agrarian situations, 
including frequent conflicts over the use of land, forest and water resources among an 
increasing number of stakeholders with different and sometimes contradictory perspectives 
(Rerkasem and Rerkasem, 1994; Trébuil et al., 1997). Recent publications demonstrate that 
sustainable NRM in such conditions requires coordination among concerned stakeholders; 
this coordination is all the more likely to lead to sustainability if it is based on trust (Rudd, 
2000; Pretty, 2003) and recognition of interdependence (Leeuwis and Van Den Ban, 2004), 
and if it is reinforced by functional local institutions (Ostrom et al., 1994). Moreover, farmers 
in the highlands have to face increasingly uncertain and dynamic situations due to factors 
such as rapid agroecological changes, destabilizing price fluctuations on markets for cash 
crops, cross-border immigration, and frequently arbitrary enforcement of environmental 
policies. Such dynamic socio-ecological systems challenge adaptability of local farming 
communities and require adaptive management (Holling, 2001). We assume that this can be 
achieved through the facilitation of a continuous collective learning process (Röling and 
Wagemakers, 1998). In this study, learning is broadly defined as a change in the way people 
perceive their social and ecological environment (and consequently the way they act on it), 
according to their experiences, beliefs, values, intentions, and interactions with other people. 
As stakeholders have multiple and sometimes conflicting interests, such a collective learning 
process also includes a negotiation dimension (Leeuwis, 2004). According to Van Paassen 
(2004), collective learning about NRM issues presents two interrelated dimensions: a better 
insight in the various stakeholders' perspectives on the problem (to negotiate a joint desired 
situation), and a better understanding of the system (to explore possible scenarios of changes 
to achieve this desired situation).  
Companion modelling (ComMod) approach is an interdisciplinary approach combining 
the iterative use of multi-agent systems (MAS) simulations and role-playing games (RPG) to 
facilitate such a learning process through the collective building of a representation of the 
situation (Bousquet et al., 1999; ComMod, 2005). Because complex situations are highly 
uncertain, the objective is not to build a model to predict the future state of the system, but to 
triggers discussions to explore possible scenarios of solution. As situations are rapidly 
evolving, such a model should be adaptive and continuously evolving to accompany not only 
the evolutions of the situations, but also the changes in participants' preoccupations. Along 
the learning process, discussions and agreement on possible solutions might raise new 
problems to be solve and require adapted model to the new emerging questions. This is what 
happened in the case study presented in this article.  
In the Akha village of Mae Salaep, northern Thailand, two successive ComMod cycles 
were implemented and accompanied changes in focus of discussions along the learning 
process. In this highland community, in a context of rapid market integration and associated 
switch from traditional subsistence agriculture to cash cropping, farmers are accused by 
lowlanders of increased land degradation through soil erosion. As environment policies are 
being reinforced, the survival of their communities could be threatened by a highly restricted 
access to farm land. The initial objective of this ComMod experiment was to facilitate a 
collective learning process in this highland community on the problem of soil erosion 
(Trébuil et al. 2002). At the end of this first cycle, participants identified the expansion of 
perennial crops as a promising solution and requested to focus the second cycle on the socio-
economic aspects related to their adoption.  
After presentations of our methods and study site, we briefly describe the first modelling 
cycle initiated in 1999-2002. This is followed by a detailed presentation of the subsequent 
cycle conducted in 2004 according to local stakeholders' suggestions of changes. The results 
and the discussion show how the flexible use of simulation and gaming tools stimulated an 
evolving collective learning process. The article ends with an evaluation of the selected 





Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are particularly appropriate to represent and simulate 
complex NRM problems because they focus on interactions among heterogeneous social 
agents and their common environment (Bousquet et al., 1993; Lansing and Kramer, 1994). In 
this study, MAS was implemented using the CORMAS2 platform designed to understand and 
simulate complex resource management systems and that is particularly open and flexible. 
We assume that its flexibility is a prerequisite for its use in an adaptive learning process.  
To better involve local stakeholders in the modelling process and the validation of its 
outputs, we translated the MAS model initially built by the researchers into a Role-Playing 
Game (RPG). The game helps the local stakeholders to understand the structure and 
operation of the computerized model and its limits, and gives them a chance to validate, 
criticize or improve it. This  translation is possible because MAS and Role-Playing Games 
(RPG) have similar components: agents corresponding to roles, the spatial interface to the 
gaming board, the time step in a simulation to a game round, etc. (Barreteau et al., 2001). 
According to Duke (1974), gaming is a mode of communication more capable than others to 
convey complexity. It allows multiple stakeholders to interactively apprehend the complex 
systems from which they are part. It triggers discussions among them because they share a 
common representation derived from the game. It is possible to test alternate scenarios in a 
game, but this quickly becomes very time consuming. In ComMod approach, the association 
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of the role playing game with multiple fast runs of MAS simulations can remove this 
constraint (Barreteau et al. 2001).  
Various kinds of associations between MAS and RPG have been tested (D'Aquino et al., 
2002). The main methodological phases implemented in this case study are presented in 
figure 1. At the end of the first ComMod cycle, which is described in details elsewhere 
(Trébuil et al., 2002), local stakeholders requested several changes in the MAS and RPG 
models to focus on a new problem. The second cycle was implemented as follows:  
(i) Field survey to gather existing knowledge and local stakeholders' perspectives on the  
new problem to be examined,  
(ii) Translation of observed dynamics into MAS and RPG models,  
(iii) Preparation of a three days workshop  in the village (including gaming & simulation 
sessions). Two officers of the local agency of Department of Public Welfare (DPW) 
facilitated our activities. The animation of the game and group debates was conducted by a 
Thai researcher from our research team, and translation from Thai to Akha was undertaken 
by one of the two DPW officers originating from this village. This person was also in charge 
of convoking the villagers. As we requested their presence for three days and they might 
need to hire day laborers to replace them in the fields, players were given an amount of 
money equivalent to three daily wages. The 12 players were chosen by the designer of the 
game in order to represent well the diversity of situations and interests within the community. 
To ensure continuity in the process, a majority had already played the first game. Thanks to 
previous field interviews, the players and the relations among them were well known from 
the research team, what facilitated careful observation, listening and management of the 
collective discussions.  
(iv) First day : gaming sessions. Following a short presentation of the rules of the RPG by 
the animators, two gaming sessions were implemented. The first one was played according to 
the researchers' representation of the actual system and was followed by a short collective 
debriefing. Then players were asked to suggest changes to make the RPG more in touch with 
their representation of reality, or to test a given scenario to solve the problem at stake. The 
second gaming session was played according to the suggested new features and rules.  
(iv) Second day : individual interviews of the players to better understand their behaviour 
during the game (for example in relation with their reality), to assess the model, and to 
evaluate the short-term learning effects of the game.  
(v) Modification of the MAS model to integrate the new knowledge acquired during the 
game, and the participants' suggestions for improvement,  
(vi) Third day : plenary session of participatory simulations using the improved MAS 
model to support discussions and exploration of scenarios,  
(vii) Back to the laboratory : more advanced simulations, 
(viii) More interviews with several players to assess the impact of this ComMod cycle on 
their perceptions and behaviours, and to evaluate their interest in the process and their 
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FIGURE 1: The iterative companion modelling process alternating field and laboratory 




Site description: land degradation in an Akha village  
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FIGURE 2: Location of Mae Salaep village, Mae Fah Luang District, Chiang Rai Province, 
upper northern Thailand. 
 
The study site is the main watershed (size: 369 ha, altitude: 500-850 m) of Mae Salaep 
village, a settlement made of two hamlets inhabited by Akhas people, the dominant ethnic 
minority in Chiang Rai province. The border with Burma is just a one-day walk across the 
mountains and the village was established in 1907 by a first group of migrants who crossed 
the border. In the last two decades, Mae Salaep small-scale farmers have been integrated into 
the market economy and their former agrarian system based on swiddening is being replaced 
by semi-permanent and cash crop-based agriculture (Trébuil et al., 2000). The perceived 
increase of the risk of soil erosion on steep slopes is becoming a major issue because 
lowlanders (Thai citizens living in the plains and the cities) complain about flash floods and 
sedimentation in their irrigation reservoirs. The Royal Forestry Department (RFD) threatens 
highlanders to further restrict their access to farm land. But whether the risk of soil erosion is 
increasing or not, and how to prevent this problem is a complex issue. Land degradation is 
not only related to agro-ecological factors, but also socio-economic ones determining the 
choice and extent of cropping systems. Moreover, the households’ integration into the market 
economy led to an extensive socioeconomic differentiation among farmers having different 
amounts of productive resources, socio-economic objectives and perception of the problem 
of soil erosion (Trébuil et al., 1997).  
The initial objective of this ComMod experiment was to facilitate a collective learning 
process at this highland community focusing on the interactions between diversification into 
cash cropping and soil erosion, to identify –if needed- acceptable corrective measures with 
the stakeholders.  
 
 
Results: the ComMod process in action 
 
This section presents the results of the two ComMod cycles implemented in Mae Salaep 
(figure 1). After a brief presentation of the RPG and the two MAS models built in the first 
cycle, its outcomes and the way participants requested changes for the second cycle are 
underlined. The results of the second cycle are then presented more in detail, step by step: 
first understanding of the situation through on-farm surveys, new MAS model and RPG built 
to focus on the new problem, results of the gaming and simulation sessions.  
 
 
First ComMod cycle initiated by researchers 
 
The first "researchers' MAS model" (MAE SALAEP 1). The first phase of the research 
process consisted in the integration of (scientific and indigenous) knowledge on farming 
systems and soil erosion obtained with on-farm surveys into a first MAE SALAEP 1 model 
(Trébuil et al., 2002). This model linked to a GIS focused on land use and land degradation 
dynamics. Considering that the validation of such preliminary “researcher model” would be 
best done by Mae Salaep farmers themselves, the model was translated into a first RPG that 
could be described as a simplified non computerized version of the model.  
 
A first role-playing game to validate the initial MAS model. In this first RPG, each 
participant plays the role of a farmer managing a set of fields located on different slopes of a 
3D block model representing the watershed. The 12 players-farmers are given various 
amounts of land and capital according to the actual farming conditions of the three main 
types of holdings present in the village: A: small and cash crop-oriented; B: medium and 
conservative; and, C:  large and diversified farming households. There were 3 players of type 
A and C, and six of B, played by farmers who actually belong to these categories. During 
each gaming round (corresponding to one crop year), the players successively assign a given 
crop to each of their fields, harvest their products, go to the market to sell them, receive 
information on land degradation in their fields, draw a "chance card" (either an exceptional 
off-farm income or household expense), and finally go to the credit desk to ask and/or 
reimburse credit if needed. Each year, the general climatic and market price conditions are 
determined by drawing a card at random. The degree of soil erosion that occurred in their 
fields is made public on a bulletin board. Four crop years could be played during each half 
day gaming session.  
 
A second RPG-based MAE SALAEP 2.1 model for communication. The knowledge about 
farmers land-use strategies acquired during Mae Salaep RPG 1 gaming sessions was used to 
build a second and much simpler MAE SALAEP 2.1 model, much more similar to the RPG 
in its rules and features. Instead of the complex GIS maps used in the first MAS model, the 
visualizing interface was a simplified watershed similar to the gaming board (Figure 3). In 
this new model, as in the game, 12 agent-farmers manage their fields according to their 
available productive resources and at each time step they carry out the same set of successive 
actions and decisions.  
 
 
FIGURE 3: Simplification of the model visual interface from MAE SALAEP 1 (left) to MAE 
SALAEP 2.1 (right) which is similar to the gaming board (centre). (*polygonal units are plots of 
various slopes (various colours); **square units are plots of players / agents located on the various slopes 
(various colours) of the catchment) 
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Mae Salaep RPG 1&2** 
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Both MAS models were used to run simulations with the local stakeholders. But we 
observed that it was easier for participants to follow computer simulations with the RPG-
based model.  
 
Outcomes of the first ComMod cycle and changes requested by participants. Mae Salaep 
farmers validated the researchers' representation of the soil erosion problem, i.e. they found it 
realistic. During this first cycle, they collectively expressed the idea that the expansion of 
perennial crops was a promising solution alleviating soil erosion while providing more stable 
incomes. Therefore they requested to focus more on the socio-economic aspects related to 
their adoption as many small landholders don't have access to perennial crops. As for the 
researchers, this first ComMod cycle allowed them to better understand local stakeholders' 
preoccupations. They decided to adjust their tools to follow this shift of focus from agro-
ecological to more socio-economic concerns.  
 
A second ComMod cycle on issue requested by Mae Salaep villagers 
 
The objective of this second cycle was to set up a collective learning process on the 
socio-economic conditions of adoption of perennial crops to examine the problem of unequal 
access to this promising solution among the different types of farmers.  
  
Understanding of the new issue through on-farm surveys. Two perennial crops dominate 
in the current local agrarian system : lychee orchards and small green tea plantations. Lychee 
orchards were introduced at the beginning of the eighties but large plantations could be 
adopted by the wealthiest farmers only. Compared to lychee, green tea (that was introduced 
more recently) is accessible to a broader range of farmers because it reaches maturity faster, 
requires no input and has more stable prices. It is generally less profitable but also much less 
risky than lychee. Perennial crops are also interesting because they require less labour than 
annual crops and provide more time for off-farm employment, a major source of income and 
investment capacity in this area. However even green tea, the so-called "plantation crop of 
the poor", is not accessible to all villagers.  
As perennial crops require a several years-long wait before harvesting the first products, 
the rules of allocation of formal and informal credit emerged as a key issue determining 
ability to invest in perennial crops. Informal credit corresponds to loans settled among 
villagers, either without interests within networks of acquaintances, or with high interest rates 
(more than 5% per month) with loan sharks. As for formal credit, beside a traditional village 
fund created ten years ago, a new government fund was made available in 2002. The older 
village fund provides small amounts of cash to any household with interest rates fluctuating 
between 2 and 5 % per month. The government fund provides larger sums, without interest, 
but is only accessible to well-off households because they are the only ones who can 
guarantee that they will reimburse the loan. This unequal distribution of the government fund 
is partially compensated by its redistribution through informal loans within networks of 
acquaintances. However, as those networks are usually small and quite homogeneous, there 
is a number of small landholders acquainted with households as poor as them who have no 
access to this source of credit.  
 
A new focus in the MAE SALAEP 2.2 model. The understanding of the situation described 
above is a first form of conceptualization, a certain view on reality. Translating this 
understanding into a conceptual model and then into a MAS model was another step. Such a 
model is not neutral, but depends upon the question the modeller wants to analyze, i.e. the 
objective of the model. So we extracted from our first understanding of the situation the key 
interacting dynamics relevant to the objectives of the model, which were :   
(i) To represent the interactions between investment in perennial crops by different types 
of farmers, allocation of formal and informal credit, and off-farm activities,  
(ii) To explore the interactions between individual decision-making processes at the 
farming household level and the resultant collective dynamics at the community level,  
(iii) To support exploration of scenarios with all the stakeholders.  
 
As two models were available, we did not start from scratch to build this new model. We 
choose to modify the simplified RPG-based model (MAE SALAEP 2.1) instead of the initial 
one because the stakeholders were more comfortable with it. The general structure of the new 
model (called MAE SALAEP 2.2 because it is a new version of the 2.1 one) is displayed on 
Figure 4. This model is composed of several interacting social, spatial and passive entities 
(for example the farmers, their plots, and the precipitations). Those entities are assigned with 




FIGURE 4: Class diagram (i.e. general structure) of the MAE SALAEP 2.2 model 
underlying the main changes made from the previous MAE SALAEP 2.1 model. (Nota: the 
double asterisks ** indicate the features added from MASalaep 2.1 to the 2.2 version.) 
 
Two main kinds of changes were made from the previous MAE SALAEP 2.1 model to 
the 2.2 version : (i) update (for example to take into account the new crops available or the 
farm differentiation process at work), (ii) changes to accompany the shift of focus from agro-
ecological to socio-economic processes. Two formal credit desks (government and village 
fund), loan sharks, and networks of acquaintances were introduced in the model with their 
rules for the allocation of credit. Farmers' individual decision-making processes regarding 
investment in perennial plantations, decision to send (or not) family labour work off-farm 
and search for credit were also modelled in detail. In the model, if credit is needed, a farmer 
will successively try to find the required loan with the government fund (no interests), his 
acquaintances, the village fund, and at the very end the loan sharks. Informal credit sources 
are also needed when a farmer cannot reimburse a formal credit fund. When an agent falls 
into debts with loan sharks, he sends part of his family labour to work in off-farm activities. 
If this is not enough, as debts keep growing, there is a moment when he is forced to sell his 
land and leave the village. A labour constraint was also introduced into the model. The 
farming households have 1, 2 or 3 workers. Each year, they have more or less profitable off-
farm opportunities (the wealthiest farmers having the most profitable ones) which they take 
or not, knowing that this might introduce a labour constraint limiting areas planted with 
annual crops. Because of the change of focus, new relevant indicators were also selected to 
follow simulations and analyze their results (presented in a section later on).  
To confront this representation of the system to the villagers' one, the new MAS model 
was translated into a new role-playing game.  
 
A new role-playing game to stimulate exchanges on adoption of plantation crops. The 
objectives of this new game (called Mae Salaep RPG 2) were as follows:  
(i) to stimulate exchanges between researchers and local stakeholders, i.e. to 
decrease the gap between their respective representations of the problem of 
unequal access to perennial crops.  
(ii) to stimulate exchanges among the local stakeholders themselves, i.e. to facilitate 
dialogue among the three main types of farmers having different points of view 
and interest regarding the expansion of perennial crops and the rules for allocating 
credit within the community. 
 
The changes made in Mae Salaep RPG 1 to conceive this new RPG 2 were almost the 
same than the modifications made in MAE SALAEP 2.1 model to build its 2.2 version (see 
previous section). Because a gaming session should not be too long to remain lively, we 
could not add more features and rules (the socio-economic ones) without simplifying some 
other aspects. We chose to simplify agro-ecological aspects to accompany the requested shift 
of focus, as presented in the Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1: Main modifications of Mae Salaep RPG 1 carried out to build the new Mae 
Salaep RPG 2 game. 
 
Mae Salaep RPG 1 Mae Salaep RPG 2 
Updating 
- Perennial crops : possibility to 
grow lychee only 
- Possibility to grow tea and lychee  
- Extent of farm size differentiation: 
from 1 to 4 
- Extent of farm size differentiation: from 1 to 8 
New socio-economic features and rules 
- One formal credit source  - Two distinct formal credit sources: government 
and village funds 
- No quantification of farm labour 
- No labour force constraint 
- Allocation of a number of workers per family 
- Maximum area of 1.8 ha of annual crops per 
family worker not involved in off-farm 
activities  
- One chance card drawn by the - Two chance cards: expenses (compulsory) and 
player: either a special expense or 
an amount of off-farm income  
- Same off-farm opportunities for 
all players  
off-farm opportunities (optional)   
 
- Specific off-farm cards for each type of farm 
Simplification of agro-ecological features 
- Soil erosion cards distributed and 
displayed 
- No erosion cards 
- No distinction between perennial 
and annual crops 
- Perennial crops represented by permanent pins, 
and annual crops by stickers removed after 
harvest  
 
During gaming sessions, beside a general observation of players’ behaviours, observers 
focus on particular aspects. Whereas in the first game the focus was on the discussions 
among players about soil erosion damages in their fields, in the second game the focus was 
on informal exchanges of cash among them. Thanks to previous interviews, the actual 
relationships among the players were known in advance and allowed to observe whether or 
not the exchanges occurred within networks of acquaintances.  
 
 
Outputs of RPG 2 gaming sessions and debriefing 
 
 In this section, we present the outputs of the gaming session of Mae Salaep RPG 2 and the 
discussions it generated among stakeholders.  
 
A first gaming session highlighting social inequity. During the first gaming session, 
medium-sized and large landholders (type B and C) invested massively in tea and lychee 
plantations. They asked credit to the credit institutions, but as it was not sufficient, they opted 
immediately for informal credit. The small landholders (type A) chose much less risky 
strategies. They planted mainly low input annual crops, and their low agricultural incomes 
were not sufficient to pay for home consumption expenses. Because everybody needed cash, 
the players were eager to draw off-farm opportunities cards, the wealthiest hoping to get the 
very profitable passport to work in Taiwan. Off-farm incomes were a main source of cash 
and these revenues were extensively redistributed among players through numerous informal 
exchanges (mainly within networks of acquaintances).  
This gaming session highlighted the problem of social inequity regarding investments in 
plantation crops because of unequal access to credit.  
 
Collective debriefing : exchange of perspective on the problem and identification of 
solutions. In the individual interviews, participants insisted on the realism of what happened 
during this first gaming session. This stimulated discussions among them to solve the 
problem. During the collective debriefing, they raised important questions such as: how 
could they change the rules of formal and informal credit so that smallholders (type A) have 
a better access to credit? Is it possible to change those rules? Would the smallholders benefit 
from such a change or would they face a too high risk of bankrupt? What would be the 
consequence for the others (type B and C)? They exchanged their views on these questions 
and two different solutions were proposed. An old participant suggested to solve the problem 
with informal credit: "It is not possible to change the rules of formal credit. Informal credit is 
more efficient. They should ask me, I would agree to lend them money without interest." On 
the other side, some younger participants suggested changes in the formal credit, and more 
precisely the rules of the government fund: they proposed a 3-year grace period for 
smallholders. The latter said that to be able to reimburse this credit, they should be allowed to 
send all their family labor work off-farm until the plantations reach maturity.  
 
Second gaming session: test of a suggested solution. After discussion, participants agreed 
to test the second suggestion (new rules of allocation of formal credit) in the afternoon 
gaming session. All the smallholders players invested in tea plantations and succeeded in 
reimbursing their loans. The other participants also had less cash constraints because most of 
their plantations had reached maturity. Because they considered they had enough money, 
numerous players refused off-farm opportunities, even if they had "nothing to lose" as they 
had no labour constraint.  
 
 
Results of simulations of scenarios with the MAE SALAEP 2.2 model 
 
In the individual interviews of the second day, players validated most of the game's features 
and made a few suggestions of improvements that were integrated into the MAS model. On 
the third day, suggested scenarios could be tested with the participants through simulations 
with the model. Players could easily understand the functioning and the limits of the model 
because of its similarities with the game.  
Three factors varied in the simulated scenarios: (i) the duration of the grace period of the 
government fund (1 or 3 years), (ii) its distribution amongst the 3 types of farms, and (iii) the 
characteristics of the networks of acquaintances for informal credit (figure 5). We analyzed 
the effects of these factors on two main indicators at the end of each simulation (15 years): (i) 
the area under perennial plantation in each type of farm (ecological indicator), (ii) the 
proportion of bankrupt farms among each type of farm (socio-economic indicator).  
The three scenarios presented in figure 6 were tested in plenary sessions with the 
participants to support collective debriefing:  
(i) The first scenario corresponds to the current situation, i.e. the rules for the operation of 
formal and informal credit are similar to the actual ones: one-year long loans from the 
government fund distributing 0, 10, and 20 thousands Bahts3 to type A, B, and C farms 
respectively.  
(ii) The second scenario tests new rules for the operation of informal credit corresponding 
to the suggestion of the old player: the lack of access to credit of type A smallholders should 
be solved through informal credit. This is translated into a scenario with larger and more 
heterogeneous social networks allocating informal credit (Figure 5). This scenario is very 
efficient to reduce the number of bankrupt smallholders but does not allow them to increase 
their investments in plantation crops. This is because they borrow money from their 
acquaintances only for urgent family consumption needs, not for investment. This scenario is 
quite theoretical because there is currently no explicit rule in the functioning of informal 
credit in the village.   
                                                 
3 In April 2005, 1 Thai baht= 0,0193 euros. 
(iii) The third scenario is implemented with a new set of rules for formal credit4: three-
year long loans of 12, 24, and 54 thousands baths for type A, B, and C farms respectively. 
This option enables the three types of farmers to invest significantly more in plantation crops. 
More simulations conducted in the laboratory show smallholders manage to reimburse the 
loan only if it remains below a certain level. In this case, they face less risk of bankruptcy 
than in the current situation thanks to the high and stable incomes from their plantations. 
However, the most efficient way to reduce their risk of bankruptcy in the model remains a 
change in networks of acquaintances for informal credit (scenario 2). 
These scenarios show the trade-off between ecological, economic and social interests and 




FIGURE 5: Different social networks among three (A, B, C) types of farms to regulate the 
distribution of informal credit in the simulations. (Nota: A, B and C farmers respectively represent 
small, medium-sized and large landholders) 
 
                                                 
4 The set of rules tested in the game which included a 3-year long grace period only for smallholders was not 
thoroughly analyzed because afterwards the participants considered this scenario unfair and unacceptable. They 
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FIGURE 6: Results of simulations exploring the effects of various rules for the allocation of 
formal and informal credit on the adoption of perennial crops and farmer's differentiation. 
 
 
Theme of a possible third ComMod cycle 
 
During the final debriefing, the participants said the idea of a 3-year long grace period 
corresponded to an official request made to the government by hundreds of rural 
communities across the country. "If tomorrow the government agrees to lend us money for 
three years, we would have to adapt very fast to this new credit situation, and these tools 
could be useful". So a first perspective could be to explore more scenarios with local 
stakeholders to support them in this task. The RPG would be important to ensure that the 
functioning of the model and its limits are known by local stakeholders, so that the results of 
the simulations are not misunderstood. Whereas, the MAS model should not be seen as a tool 
to select a technical and quantitative decision but as a mean to facilitate the exploration of 
different options beforehand.  
A second possible perspective was suggested by the officers of the Department of Public 
Welfare who would be interested to launch a collective learning process on how villagers 
could organize themselves within a cooperative to process and sell their agricultural products. 
The aim is to limit the negative effects of important price fluctuations on the market for their 
horticultural products and the topic corresponds to a project launched by the development 
agency with the villagers. This proposition illustrates the fact that the process could move in 
another very different direction, with a new ComMod cycle based on a new RPG and 
associated model.  
Type A
Type B
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type of farm (ha) 
I II III
Scenario I: current situation 
and rules 
 
Scenario II: modified rules for 
informal credit (larger and 
more heterogeneous social 
networks of acquaintances). 
 
Scenario III: modified rules for 
formal credit (longer period for 
reimbursement and more 
equitable distribution). 
: Small market integrated farms 
: Medium-sized & conservative farms 
A third possible evolution was suggested by participants who were asked what other 
stakeholders should be invited to a future gaming session. They answered that the TAO (sub-
district administration) officers should be invited to play their own role into the game, "so 
that they know what is happening in the village". Except the local officers of the Department 
of Public Welfare, official representatives of administrations at a higher level were neither 
integrated into the model nor invited to the participatory workshops so far because we 
thought that their presence could have intimidated villagers and brought the collective 
discussions to a standstill. The villagers' suggestion to invite TAO officers means that they 
feel now rather confident in using the proposed tools. As discussed in the final part of this 
article, this underlines the need (in the eyes of participants) to reinforce institutional linkages 
to increase the impact of the ComMod process.  
 
 
Evaluation of the process and lessons learnt 
 
In the following sections, we first analyze the collective learning process that was 
stimulated by the use of gaming and simulation tools in this Commod process. Second we 
identify the methodological aspects that contributed to the successes of this process, in 
particular the flexibility of the gaming and simulation tools. Third we underline its current 
limits and some perspectives of improvements.  
 
 
Evaluation of the collective learning process 
 
How to evaluate a learning process? With which criteria? According to Van der Veen 
(2000), such an evaluation depends on the type of learning. This author distinguishes three 
types of learning : reproductive learning (linear transmission of knowledge), communicative 
learning (constructing with others an inter-subjective understanding of the subject), and 
transformative learning (changes in perspectives leading to more inclusive views of the 
subject). In our case study, we aimed at facilitating a combination of communicative and 
transformative learning. In the case of reproductive learning, you can evaluate and measure 
how much new knowledge participants can demonstrate, if they use it in practice and 
whether this influence their results. If this method still seems to apply in certain situations of 
communicative learning, Van der Veen states that it is clearly more tricky for transformative 
learning. In this case the only option is to adopt a rather qualitative self-assessment by 
participants, i.e. to ask them whether participation led to a perspective transformation, what 
kind of transformation it was, and how it changed their behaviour and results. This is what 
we did in the interviews the day after the game, and again three weeks later.  
To begin with, we propose to answer the question: what did people learn and how? In 
particular, what type of learning occurred, and how was it stimulated by the association of 
the simulation and gaming tools? We distinguish between the researchers' and the local 
stakeholders' learning processes.  
 
What did the researcher learn and how? In this process, researchers learnt in three 
different ways. First, the ComMod process triggered an interactive exchange of perspectives 
on the system under study with the local stakeholders. The first game was a first 
representation of the situation by the researchers focusing on agro-ecological aspects of soil 
erosion. The game allowed the players to understand this representation and to react on it. 
They found this representation realistic (this is a form of validation), but they requested some 
changes to better fit to their representation of the problem of soil erosion and to their 
preferred way to alleviate it, i.e. to introduce socio-economic dimensions related to the 
adoption of perennial crops. In the second ComMod cycle, the adapted representation of the 
situation triggered more discussions among stakeholders themselves. According to Duke 
(1974), this is the main validation of a game.  
Second, researchers could improve their understanding of the situation thanks to the 
observation of players' behaviours. They elucidated tacit knowledge about the local credit 
system, and in particular the distribution of power amongst villagers in the decision making 
process regarding the allocation of formal credit. Such tacit knowledge explains the 
difference between the way people say they behave (this corresponds to the limited 
knowledge acquired from previous interviews), and their actual behaviour (whose several 
aspects were revealed in the game because of the spontaneity it triggers).  
Third, the simulations run with the improved model (integrating the knowledge acquired 
during the game) allowed the research team to better understand the functioning of the 
complex system under study. 
 
What did local stakeholders learn and how? The first ComMod cycle triggered 
exchanges mainly between researchers and participants, whereas in the second one, the 
participants emphasized in the interviews that the experiment allowed them to better 
understand each other's situations and points of views, by providing a kind of "democratic" 
(in the words of one of them) platform for communication that does not exist in their current 
social and institutional situation. They could in particular better understand the kind of 
difficulties faced by others and could exchange their different views regarding the credit 
issue. A community leader declared that "in every day life, everyone has his own problems; 
there is no place where we can think all together like in the game". The game triggered an 
initial phase of communicative learning among participants that was facilitated by the fact 
that they share a common "language or jargon derived from the game event" (Duke 1974, p 
64). This phase triggered the collective definition of a desired situation.  
Second, local stakeholders could improve their understanding of the functioning of the 
complex system by exploring "what if" questions. In the learning process, this corresponds to 
a phase during which they wonder how they could reach the identified desired situation. This 
was triggered by the exploration of scenarios with the game and with the MAS model 
(learning process based on discovering and experimentation). As the community leader 
mentioned: "The players can try by themselves (how to plan to invest in plantations). It is 
more efficient than speaking." According to another participant, the game was said to "help 
to think in advance" as during a session, players could observe 6 cropping seasons and assess 
the effects of their choices. "In every day life we do not have the opportunity to think in 
advance. We can only think to grow maize each year to buy and eat rice". 
Argyris and Schön (1996) distinguish between single and double loop collective learning. 
Single loop learning occur when people change their existing practices without changing 
their beliefs, norms or values. In double loop learning, changes take place also in their 
underlying insights and principles. This corresponds to transformative learning. In our case 
study, participants mentioned several times that this ComMod experiment allowed them to 
think differently than in "every day life". "Without the game, we would go on in our every 
day life", said a participant. This is an evidence of transformative learning.  
 
 
Factors contributing to the success of this collective learning process 
 
Increased participation of local stakeholders. At least two observations denote an 
increased participation of local stakeholders in the ComMod process. First, whereas 
following the RPG 1 sessions, dialogue between researchers and the local stakeholders 
dominated, the RPG 2 stimulated more dialogue among local stakeholders themselves.  
Second, whereas in the 1st cycle the participants mainly suggested changes in the model 
to better fit to their representation of the reality, in the 2nd cycle, their suggestions were more 
oriented towards exploration of "what if" questions (scenarios of new credit rules). This 
evolution can be seen as an expression of a phenomenon described by Duke (1974) as "initial 
inertia", i.e. "the initial difficulty of getting players involved into a game" (p.205). The first 
cycle allowed stakeholders to overcome this "initial inertia" and to become familiar with its 
language and representations. Once they got a global picture of the complex system 
represented in the game, they were more at ease and could suggest changes. Then, in the 
second ComMod cycle, they had entered a stage where their skills in the game allowed them 
to explore new options.  
This increased participation of local stakeholders is a positive evaluation of the process as 
its overall objective is to enable them to participate genuinely in decision making processes 
in complex NRM situations. Beside the phenomenon of initial inertia, two factors seem to 
contribute to this positive evolution. First, the research team considers participation as a goal, 
and not as a mean, and therefore paid attention to the evaluation of the process by the 
participants themselves. The research team adjusted its tools according to their requests, so 
that they focused on questions that local stakeholders themselves had raised. Second, the 
flexibility of the tools was important to achieve this, as discussed in the following section.  
 
Highly flexible tools needed to support evolving learning process. Duke wrote in 1974: 
"Future's languages are a dynamic communication form; they must respond during use to 
changing perceptions of the problem." (p. 51). This experiment illustrates how the simulation 
and gaming tools were flexibly adjusted to the changing local context and stakeholders' 
preoccupations to support the collective learning process.  
The first models and game focusing on erosion were the researchers' initial interpretation 
of the situation and problem. Then changes were introduced to match the representation and 
aspirations of the local stakeholders. We added new socioeconomic dynamics interacting 
with the existing dynamics such as decision making processes regarding investment in 
perennial crops or off-farm activities, and deleted some other ones. We introduced new 
stakeholders such as loan sharks or government fund committees and added new 
characteristics to the existing stakeholders. We created new socio-economic indicators and 
representations and left aside some other ones. The flexibility of the modelling tool is partly 
due to the fact that MAS is an object-oriented modelling approach that offers the possibility 
to add or delete agents or to modify the model features and object behaviour without having 
to change the whole model. Moreover, the CORMAS platform, tailored to facilitate the 
modelling process thanks to a certain number of predefined algorithm, is a particularly 
"open" framework that does not constrain the modeller too much. The RPG tailored 
specifically for the experiment also presented the advantage to be completely adaptable. 
During the workshop, local stakeholders saw their critical remarks and propositions for the 
future included in the model and the role playing game.  
Another interesting point of this experiment is the fact the initial model was simplified to 
facilitate the comprehension, ease-of-use and better focus on the issue at stake of the local 
stakeholders. When dealing with complex agro-ecosystems, researchers can be tempted to 
build more and more complex models. The transition from the initial very sophisticated GIS-
based model (MAE SALAEP 1) to the much more simple MAE SALAEP 2.1 illustrates that 
the evolution does not necessary lead to an increased sophistication of the tools. The most 
useful models for local stakeholders are not necessary the most exhaustive ones. Each model 
is a subjective extraction of the key relevant dynamics of the system at a particular moment 
of the collective learning process among particular stakeholders. The generated family of 




The need for a stronger institutional linkage 
 
Dialogue of higher institutional levels. Although the process led to changes in people's 
perceptions, it did not lead to concrete impacts for the community, mainly because of a lack 
of institutional support so far. This is quite evident for the suggestion to change the grace 
period of the government fund as it is decided at the government level. But beyond this 
simple explanation, this raises an important question. A member of the government fund 
committee played the game, but he did not participate very much in the debates because as he 
said, "to change the rules, all the committee members must agree on them" and he knew that 
"some of them would not agree". Whether or not it is in the interest of the local institutions to 
participate to a collective negotiation process with the villagers is a crucial question. The 
need to establish dialogue with higher institutional levels is the reason why among the three 
identified paths toward a 3rd ComMod cycle, we will opt for the 3rd one, i.e. the integration of 
the TAO (sub-district administration) officers in the game and model. As villagers 
themselves requested their presence, we have a good opportunity to test the efficiency of the 
ComMod process to facilitate such a dialogue.  
 
Involvement of a local facilitator. The way the member of the government fund 
committee expresses his reluctance to changes also illustrates the fact that rules and 
institutions are deeply rooted and cannot be changed within a few weeks. This underlines the 
need for more continuity in the process, what could be achieved by the greater involvement 
of people from local institutions as facilitators. We initially envisaged an eventual 
involvement of the two officers of the local governmental agency (Department of Public 
Welfare) that facilitated our research activities. The main one in charge of Mae Salaep 
village has a classic view of rural development in which the effective participation of local 
stakeholders is limited. However, his attitude changed between the RPG 1 and RPG 2 
sessions from a very interventionist to a more listening one. The question remains whether or 
not he (and his agency) will involve further in the ComMod process in the future. If he does, 





The combination of simulation and role playing games explored in this study flexible 
accompanied a collective learning processes on complex Natural Resources Management 
(NRM) issues within a community. It stimulated exchange of view points and dialogue 
between researchers and stakeholders, and more importantly, among stakeholders themselves. 
But what to do to ensure that this kind of experiment does not remain only a dialogue among 
a few villagers that is admittedly very interesting for the researchers but that has no other 
repercussion for the villagers themselves? How to strengthen and extent the effects of 
ComMod experiments?  
When thinking about an extension of ComMod approaches in northern Thailand, a first 
limit that comes to mind is the fact that it is reasonably not possible to invest as much time as 
we did in this experiment in many villages across the region. This region is characterized by 
a important heterogeneity in space. The three main mountainous chains dividing this region 
have supported the implantation of various isolated minority communities that have all 
develop their own local agrarian history. Despite their heterogeneity, many communities are 
confronted by the same kind of NRM problems. The tools designed to support dialogue to 
solve conflicts over land, water or forest resources in one community could be useful to other 
communities. The flexibility of the tools would be once more a very valuable characteristic.  
A first way to up-scale the ComMod approach is the training of a network of practitioners 
interested by this approach and the multiplication of local ComMod experiments. A 
complementary way to strengthen and extend the approach would be the dialogue with 
organizations at higher level. If within a community, people want to change things, they need 
the support of these higher levels of organization. In return, the changes at these levels of 
organization – and in particular government agencies- can be on benefit of several local 
communities.  
The ideal would be that these organizations themselves adopt such approaches. The 
effective adoption of participation by government agencies is a challenge in a kingdom like 
Thailand that has traditionally had a highly centralized form of governance. However the 
current process of decentralization, and in particular the 1997 Constitution and the 
establishment of elected tambon councils at the sub-district level, constitute important 
opportunities to remodel the institutional framework in a way favouring dialogue between 
local communities and the once untouchable bureaucracy. Our future challenge is to test and 





Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1996). Organizational Learning II. Theory, method, and practice. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Barreteau, O., Bousquet, F. and Attonaty, J. (2001). Role-playing games for opening the 
black box of multi-agent systems: method and lessons of its application to Senegal 
River valley irrigated systems. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 4,  
Bousquet, F., Barreteau, O., Le Page, C., Mullon, C. and Weber, J. (1999). An environmental 
modelling approach. The use of multi-agents simulations. In Blasco, F. and Weill, A. 
(Eds.) Advances in Environmental and Ecological Modelling, 113-122. Paris: 
Elsevier.  
Bousquet, F., Cambier, C., Morand P., Quensière J., Mullon C. and Pavé, A. (1993). 
Simulating the interaction between a society and a renewable resource. Journal of 
Biological Systems, 1 (1), 199-214.  
Commod, C. (2005). La modélisation comme outil d'accompagnement. Natures Sciences 
Sociétés, 13, 165-168.  
D'Aquino, P., Barreteau, O., Etienne, M., Boissau, S., Aubert, S., Bousquet, F., Le Page, C. 
and W., D. (2002). The Role Playing Games in an ABM Participatory Modeling 
Process: Outcomes from Five Different Experiments Carried out in the Last Five 
Years. Paper presented at IEMSS, 24-27 juin, Lugano. 
Duke, R. D. (1974). Gaming: the future's language. New York: SAGE Publications, Halsted 
Press. 
Ferber, J. (1999). Multi-Agent Systems: An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence. 
Boston: Addison-Wesley Longman.  
Ganjanapan, A. (2002). Complexity of rights and legal pluralism in participatory watershed 
management. In Jianchu, X. and Mikesell, S. (Eds) Lanscapes of diversity. 
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Montane Mainland Southeast 
Asia (MMSEA 3), Lijiang, China: Yunnan Science and Technology Press. 207-212. 
Holling, C. S. (2001). Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological and social 
systems. Ecosystems, 4, 390-405.  
Lansing, J. S. and Kremer, J. N. (1994). Emergent properties of Balinese water temple 
networks: coadaptaion on a rugged fitness landscape. In C.Langton (Eds.) Artificial 
life III., Santa Fe: Addison-Wesley.  
Leeuwis, C. and Van Den Ban, A. W. (2004). Communication for rural innovation. 
Rethinking agricultural extension. Oxford: Blackwell publishing Ltd.  
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and Walker, J. (1994). Rules, games & common-pool resources. 
Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press.  
Pretty, J. (2003). Social capital and the collective management of resources. Science, 302, 
1912-1914.  
Rerkasem, K. and Rerkasem, B. (1994). Shifting cultivation in Thailand: its current situation 
and dynamics in the context of Highland Development. London: International 
Institute for Environment and development.  
Röling, N. G. and Wagemakers, M. A. (1998). A new practise: facilitating sustainable 
agriculture. In Röling, N. G. and Wagemakers, M. A. (Eds.) Facilitating Sustainable 
Agriculture: Participatory learning and adaptive management in times of 
environmental uncertainty, 3-22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Rudd, M. A. (2000). Live long and prosper: collective action, social capital and social vision. 
Ecological economics, 34 (234), 131-144.  
Rutherford, J. (2002). Institutions, Impacts and responses in the agrarian transformation of 
the mountains of northern Thailand. In Jianchu, X. and Mikesell, S. (Eds) Lanscapes 
of diversity. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Montane Mainland 
Southeast Asia (MMSEA 3), Lijiang, China: Yunnan Science and Technology Press. 
55-78. 
Trébuil, G., Kam, S. P., Turkelboom, F. and Shinawatra, B. (1997). Diagnoses at Field, Farm 
and Watershed Levels in Diversifying Upland Agroecosystems: Towards 
Comprehensive Solutions to Farmers' Problems. In Kropff, M. J., Teng, P. S., 
Aggarwal, P. K.et al. (Eds) Systems Approaches for Sustainable Agricultural 
Development: Applications of Systems Approaches at the Farm and Regional Levels. 
Proceedings from IRRI International Symposium, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
International Rice Research Institute. 99-114. 
Trébuil, G., Shinawatra-Ekasingh, B., Bousquet, F. and Thong-Ngam, C. (2002). Multi-agent 
systems companion modelling for integrated watershed management: a northern 
Thailand experience. In Jianchu, X. and Mikesell, S. (Eds) Landcapes of diversity. 
Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Montane Mainland Southeast Asia 
(MMSEA 3), Lijiang, Yunnan, China: Yunnan Science and Technology Press, China. 
55-78. 
Trébuil, G., Thong-Ngam, C., Turkelboom, F., Grellet, G. and Kam, S. P. (2000). Trends of 
Land Use Change and Interpretation of Impacts in the Mae Chan Area of Northern 
Thailand. Paper presented at 2nd symposium on Montane Mainland Southeast Asia: 
Governance in the Natural and Cultural Landscape, 1-5 July 2000, Chiang Mai, 
Thailand. 
Van der Veen, R. G. W. (2000). Learning natural resource management. Paper presented at 
ISNAR Conference: Deepening the basis of rural resource management, February 16-





Work: CU-CIRAD ComMod Project, Dpt of Biology, Fac. Of Sciences, 
Chulalongkorn University, 254 Phyathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok 10330, 
THAILAND. 
Telephone: + 66 (0) 86-775-9758 




Work: Faculty of Business Administration, Chiang Mai University, 
Chiang Mai 50200, THAILAND.  
Phone: + 66 (0) 53-942109 




Work: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, 






Work: CIRAD-TERA, UPR 47 GREEN, Campus International de Baillarguet, TA 
60/15, 34398 Montpellier cedex 5, FRANCE. 
Phone: +33 4 67 59 38 32 
Fax: +33 4 67 59 38 27 
E-mail: françois.bousquet@cirad.fr 
 
